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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 ____________________ 
 
 
 
PRATT, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
  
 Plaintiff James C. Feldman claims the defendant  
Philadelphia Housing Authority ("PHA"), through its agents, 
defendants Jonathan A. Saidel and John Paone, violated the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United 
States, as well as the State of Pennsylvania's "whistleblower" 
statute, by firing him in retaliation for publishing reports that 
exposed wrongdoing at PHA.  After a jury trial the district court 
entered judgment for plaintiff on all claims, awarding him 
$616,696 in compensatory damages and a total of $20,000 in 
punitive damages.  Defendants appeal.  We affirm. 
 
FACTS AND BACKGROUND 
 Since the jury found for Feldman, we view the facts by 
drawing from the evidence all reasonable inferences in his favor. 
  
 Defendant PHA, a public agency responsible for 
providing housing for low-income citizens, is the largest housing 
agency in Pennsylvania and fourth largest in the United States.  
The agency is governed by a board of commissioners consisting of 
five members, two each being appointed by the mayor and the city 
controller, respectively, with the fifth member being selected by 
the four appointees.  
 In January 1990 Saidel, exercising his authority as 
Philadelphia's city controller, appointed himself to the board of 
commissioners.  Three months later, Paone was named as PHA's new 
executive director, responsible for overseeing the day-to-day 
activities of the agency.  Paone and Saidel worked closely 
together, routinely discussing the daily management and affairs 
of PHA. 
 Feldman had been working at PHA since 1982.  From May 
1990 until his termination on May 3, 1991, Feldman acted as the 
director of the agency's Internal Audit Department.  In this 
capacity, Feldman was responsible for investigating, identifying, 
and exposing waste, inefficiency, fraud, and criminal activity 
within PHA.  In order to carry out this function, Feldman 
regularly prepared detailed reports of his investigations.  Under 
the internal-audit charter, which specifies the responsibilities 
of the Internal Audit Department, Feldman was required to present 
his findings and observations to the executive director and the 
board of commissioners, i.e. to Paone, as executive director; and 
to Saidel, as chairman of the board of commissioners as well as 
to the four other members of the board.   
  
 For most of Feldman's career at PHA, his work was 
considered exemplary.  His personnel file contained no reprimands 
or comments concerning poor job performance.  His last 
performance evaluation, dated April 24, 1990, gave Feldman a 
rating of "SUPERIOR".  However, after Saidel became chairman of 
the board and Paone became executive director, things changed.  
In several of his reports on PHA's management and operations over 
approximately the next twelve months, Feldman revealed numerous 
improprieties in several key areas at the agency.  As required by 
the internal auditing charter, Feldman made his reports to Paone, 
Saidel, and the rest of the board.  Many of his reports 
criticized the job PHA's management was doing.  On several 
occasions, Paone and Saidel reprimanded Feldman for preparing the 
critical reports.   
 Paone was particularly displeased with Feldman after he 
reported that management had promoted a PHA employee who was 
under investigation for corruption.  As a result of a tip, the 
Internal Audit Department had conducted an investigation of PHA's 
Central Maintenance Department.  The investigation revealed that 
the Central Maintenance Department, which was responsible for the 
agency's fencing contracts, was involved in an illegal bid-
rigging scheme, and several PHA employees were linked to the 
unlawful activity.  Feldman periodically reported to Paone and 
Saidel on the details of this investigation, including which PHA 
employees were probably involved.  Ultimately, Feldman reported 
that one of the implicated employees had been promoted despite 
being under the continuing investigation.  Paone challenged 
  
Feldman, saying, "I thought you were on our side".  Paone then 
instructed Feldman to remove from his report the reference to the 
mid-investigation promotion.  Feldman complied.   
 Later, after Feldman circulated a quarterly report to 
the board that criticized certain other managerial decisions, 
Paone and Saidel separately reprimanded Feldman and instructed 
him that in the future he was to report his findings to Paone 
only.  Feldman refused to yield to this direction, because it was 
contrary to the internal-audit charter, and he continued to 
circulate his reports to the entire board.   
 The last matter that Feldman worked on that was to be 
circulated to the board was a human-resources audit.  The purpose 
of the audit was to determine if PHA management was using its 
employees in an efficient and economical manner.  Feldman had 
routinely advised the board and Paone of the progress of the 
audit.  The final audit report would have revealed favoritism and 
other improprieties in personnel decisions made by Paone and 
Saidel.  In general, the audit was very critical of the manner in 
which PHA was being run.   
 Around the same time, however, Paone and Saidel were 
portraying their management of PHA to the public in a different 
light.  Saidel prepared a "Letter from the Chairman" that was 
featured in PHA's 1991 annual report.  The letter stated that 
although the agency had previously been "financially 
floundering", when he became chairman and Paone became executive 
director, "[t]hings had to change fast -- and they did".  He went 
on to say that the board of commissioners "began to reorganize 
  
PHA management and restore the Authority to a viable condition".  
Moreover, in the "Letter from the Executive Director", also 
featured in the annual report, Paone said that PHA's greatest 
challenge was "to win the hearts, minds and respect of our 
residents and to develop a team approach with them in resolving 
other major issues".  Had it been published, Feldman's human 
resources audit report would have severely undercut the annual 
report's glowing portrayal of management's success. 
 The same day the human-resources report was to be 
circulated to the board, Paone, after conferring with Saidel, 
fired Feldman.  He told Feldman that, effective immediately, his 
services were no longer needed, because the agency had decided to 
reorganize the Internal Audit Department.  Feldman was then 
promptly escorted out of his office by two police officers, 
without being given an opportunity to retrieve his work or 
publish the audit report.  
 Four months later, Feldman instituted this action in 
district court against PHA, Paone, and Saidel, and against other 
PHA board members who were dismissed from the action as 
defendants at the completion of plaintiff's case-in-chief.  
Feldman alleged that defendants had fired him for 
"whistleblowing" in violation of the first and fourteenth 
amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 
1423(a) and (b) (the Pennsylvania "Whistle-blower" Law). 
 The case was tried before the Honorable William H. 
Yohn, Jr. and a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of 
Feldman and against defendants PHA, Saidel, and Paone.  The jury 
  
awarded Feldman  $616,696 in compensatory damages, of which 
$500,000 was for front pay.  It also awarded Feldman punitive 
damages against Paone and Saidel in their individual capacities, 
in the amount of $10,000 each.  Defendants now appeal.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 Defendant PHA raises three issues on appeal:             
1) whether the district court erred in not granting judgment as a 
matter of law dismissing the first amendment and "whistleblower" 
claims; 2) whether the district court erred by allowing an award 
of front pay instead of reinstating plaintiff at PHA; and          
3) whether the jury's $500,000 award for front pay was excessive.  
 Both Paone and Saidel argue that the evidence was 
insufficient to justify punitive damages.  Saidel also challenges 
the award of punitive damages against him, claiming a lack of 
evidence to establish that he personally participated in 
Feldman's firing.   
 We affirm. 
   
DISCUSSION 
 Review of a denial of a directed verdict is plenary, 
and we invoke the same standard that the district court applies.  
Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
Feldman, the nonmoving party, we determine whether there is 
evidence reasonably tending to support his claim.  See Bielevicz 
v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 849 (3d Cir. 1990).  While the role of 
an appellate court, in a first amendment case, requires an 
enhanced examination of the entire record, see Bose Corp. v. 
  
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984), "[a] 
jury verdict will not be overturned unless the record is 
critically deficient of that quantum of evidence from which a 
jury could have rationally reached its verdict".  Swineford v. 
Snyder County, 15 F.3d 1258, 1265 (3d Cir. 1994).   
 
A. First Amendment Claim     
 Feldman recovered, in part, on a theory that his firing 
was in retaliation for his having engaged in speech protected 
under the first amendment.  Determining whether PHA's dismissal 
of Feldman violated the first amendment requires a three-step 
analysis.  See Swineford, 15 F.3d at 1270; Czurlanis v. Albanese, 
721 F.2d 98, 103 (3d Cir. 1983).  Feldman was first required to 
show that his speech constituted protected activity.  See 
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).  If 
protected, Feldman then had to establish that the speech was a 
substantial or motivating factor for his discharge.  See Mt. 
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 
(1977).  If Feldman satisfied the first two steps, then 
defendants could avoid liability by showing that they would have 
fired Feldman anyway.  Id.  
  
 1. Constitutionally Protected Activity 
 A state cannot lawfully discharge an employee for 
reasons that infringe upon that employee's constitutionally 
protected interest in freedom of speech.  Rankin v. McPherson, 
483 U.S. 378, 383 (1987).  A public employee's freedom of speech, 
however, does have its limits.  The court must weigh the 
employee's interest in free speech against the government's 
interest in promoting efficiency among its employees.  See 
Versarge v. Township of Clinton New Jersey, 984 F.2d 1359, 1364 
(3d Cir. 1993). As the Supreme Court explained in Pickering: 
 The problem in any case is to arrive at a 
balance between the interests of the 
[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon 
matters of public concern and the interest of 
the State, as an employer, in promoting the 
efficiency of the public services it performs 
through its employees. 
 
391 U.S. at 568.  It is for the court, not the jury, to perform 
the Pickering balancing test.  See Czurlanis, 721 F.2d at 105 
("As the Supreme Court made clear in Connick, it is the role of 
the court in a case alleging retaliatory action which violates 
the First Amendment to decide not only whether the speech at 
issue related to a matter of public concern, but also to conduct 
the necessary Pickering balancing.").  
 Thus, in order to determine whether Feldman's speech 
was protected, we must first determine if the speech related to 
matters of public concern, or constituted merely personal 
grievances,  see Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983); 
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, and looking at the entire record, we 
  
must consider the content, form, and context of the speech for 
which Feldman contends he was fired.  See Connick, 461 U.S. at 
147-48.   
 An employee's speech addresses a matter of public 
concern when it can "be fairly considered as relating to any 
matter of political, social or other concerns of the community".  
Id. at 146.  Feldman's speech was not related in any way to 
personal grievances; on the contrary, it clearly pertained to 
matters of important public concern.  The very purpose of his 
auditing reports was to ferret out and highlight any 
improprieties that he found at PHA.  Disclosing corruption, 
fraud, and illegality in a government agency is a matter of 
significant public concern.  See Swineford, 15 F.3d at 1274.   
 Next we must balance Feldman's interests in engaging in 
the speech, together with the public's interest in listening, 
against defendants' interest in promoting efficiency at PHA.  Id. 
The interests of Feldman, as well as the public, in exposing 
governmental wrongdoing of the nature and magnitude that  
Feldman's reports exposed, is very strong.  We have recently 
recognized: 
 Speech involving government impropriety 
occupies the highest rung of First Amendment 
protection.  Moreover, the public's 
substantial interest in unearthing 
governmental improprieties requires courts to 
foster legitimate whistleblowing.  
  
Swineford, 15 F.3d at 1274.   
 
 Defendants, however, stress in opposition the 
disruptive impact of Feldman's speech which, they argue, was 
  
sufficient to deprive it of constitutional protection.  This 
argument is misplaced.  We have previously explained: 
 The First Amendment balancing test [of 
Pickering] can hardly be controlled by 
finding that disruption did occur.  An 
employee who accurately exposes rampant 
corruption in her office no doubt may disrupt 
and demoralize much of the office.  But it 
would be absurd to hold that the First 
Amendment generally authorizes corrupt 
officials to punish subordinates who blow the 
whistle simply because the speech somewhat 
disrupted the office * * *.  The point is 
simply that the balancing test articulated in 
Pickering is truly a balancing test, with 
office disruption or breached confidences 
being only weights on the scales.   
 
Czurlanis, 721 F.2d at 107 (quoting Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 
770, 773-74 (5th Cir. 1979)) (emphasis in original).  Moreover, 
revelations of misconduct at PHA by Feldman stand in a unique 
position. Feldman was not the typical employee exposing fraud 
within one's work environment; he was the head of a department 
whose very job it was to uncover improprieties.  Feldman's 
conduct was not only permitted, but required by the Internal 
Audit Department's charter, which provided:   
 It is the policy of the Philadelphia Housing 
Authority (PHA) to determine the adequacy and 
effectiveness of management policies, 
controls and procedures with respect to all 
activities within PHA, and to insure full 
compliance with such policies, controls and 
procedures. 
  
 In order to implement this objective, it is 
the policy of PHA to provide and support an 
Internal Audit Department to determine the 
adequacy and effectiveness of management 
policies, controls and procedures in 
discharging management's responsibilities for 
the control of assets and operations * * *. 
  
 
(emphasis added).   
 As director of the Internal Audit Department, Feldman 
was responsible for uncovering and reporting any wrongdoing that 
he discovered at PHA.  If done correctly, Feldman's very job was 
to be disruptive.  His responsibility to investigate and ferret 
out improprieties extended not only to Feldman's co-workers, but 
also to Paone, the executive director, and yes, even Saidel, the 
chairman of the board.  The charter specifically provided that 
the Internal Audit Department must "determine the adequacy and 
effectiveness of management policies, controls and procedures in 
discharging management's responsibilities for the control of 
assets and operations". (emphasis added).  
 Exposing waste, fraud, and corruption within an agency 
will likely cause disruption, particularly when done by a person 
whose responsibility it is to unveil such conduct.  This type of 
disruption, however, cannot justify a retaliatory discharge.   
 At the time of his firing, Feldman was about to publish 
an audit report that would have revealed wrongdoing on the part 
of Paone and Saidel.  Feldman, however, was fired the day the 
report was to be published.  The jury could have reasonably 
concluded that this was no coincidence, especially in light of 
the fact that after being fired, Feldman was escorted from his 
office by two police officers, and prevented from either 
circulating the report or even retrieving any of his work.   
 Very likely, publication of the report would have 
caused some disruption at PHA, particularly between Feldman and 
  
his superiors, Paone and Saidel.  Defendants would have us 
believe, however, that the disruption would have been great 
enough to justify, under Pickering balancing, their firing of 
Feldman.  We disagree.  Feldman did what the charter required him 
to do; failure to do so would have been a breach of his 
responsibilities.  Moreover, the subject matter of his reports -- 
improprieties in governmental business -- occupies a high level 
of public concern.  Simply because his reports might cause 
disruption in the eyes of Paone and Saidel, the very people he 
was reporting on, could not be a sufficient justification for his 
discharge.  We conclude that Feldman's speech was 
constitutionally protected. 
 
 2. Unconstitutional Discharge 
 Feldman contended that his discharge was caused by 
defendants' retaliatory motives.  The record is replete with 
evidence from which the jury could properly conclude that  
Feldman's firing was directly precipitated by his engaging in 
protected speech.  Initially, defendants told Feldman that the 
reason he was being fired was that they were reorganizing the 
audit department.  This, the jury could have found, was a 
pretext.  Except for a few minor changes, the audit department 
was substantially the same at the time of trial as it was when 
Feldman was fired.   
 Defendants later abandoned their initial reason for the 
firing, and launched an intense attack on Feldman's ability to 
perform his job.  They alleged, inter alia, that Feldman was 
  
insubordinate, self-serving, and overall, an incompetent 
employee.  Their attack on Feldman's alleged incompetence as the 
reason for his dismissal raised a jury issue.  Incidentally, the 
argument is substantially undercut by PHA's present contention 
that Feldman should be reinstated at PHA instead of receiving 
front pay.  Because there is ample evidence to support the jury's 
finding that Feldman was fired for engaging in protected 
activity, we affirm the jury's determination that defendants 
violated Feldman's constitutional rights. 
 Defendants also argue that the district court committed 
reversible error by failing to conduct, on the record, 
particularized fact-finding and balancing under Pickering.  They 
further contend that the district court inappropriately submitted 
to the jury all of Feldman's statements and reports before first 
determining for itself which, if any, were protected.  
Defendants, however, have failed to preserve these issues for 
appeal.  They did not except to the court's jury instruction con-
cerning Pickering, nor did they take any pre-verdict exception to 
the district court's failure to make specific factual findings on 
the record.    
 Even if defendants had properly preserved the record, 
we would still affirm.   Although the district court did not 
perform the Pickering balancing test in precisely the fashion 
that some cases suggest is appropriate, it is apparent from the 
district court's memorandum and order denying defendants' motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, that it had considered 
all of Feldman's speech to be constitutionally protected under 
  
Pickering.  Consequently, we see no prejudicial error in the 
court's having first submitted the same issue to the jury, which 
arrived at the same conclusion.     
 
B. Front Pay Versus Reinstatement 
  PHA argues that the district court erred by permitting 
an award of front pay instead of ordering Feldman reinstated at 
PHA.  The equitable remedy of reinstatement is available for 
discharges that violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Versarge, 984 F.2d 
at 1368, and reinstatement is the preferred remedy to cover the 
loss of future earnings.   See Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829 
F.2d 367, 373-74 (3d Cir. 1987).   However, reinstatement is not 
the exclusive remedy, because it is not always feasible, such as 
when there exists "irreparable animosity between the parties". 
Id. at 374.; see also Versarge, 984 F.2d at 1368.  When 
reinstatement is not appropriate, front pay is the alternate 
remedy.  See Maxfield v. Sinclair International, 766 F.2d 788, 
796 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986).  Guided 
by the particular circumstances of a case, the district court has 
broad discretion in determining whether reinstatement is 
appropriate, and its determination is reviewed under an abuse-of-
discretion standard.  See id.  
 Although Feldman initially requested reinstatement in 
his complaint, he sought, prior to trial, to have reinstatement 
excluded as a potential remedy.  The district court deferred its 
ruling until after both sides had presented their evidence to the 
jury.  Then, having heard all the evidence, the district court 
  
held that reinstatement was not feasible, because "irreparable 
distrust and animosity developed between Feldman and PHA as a 
result of the events prior to his termination, the termination 
itself, and the litigation that followed in its wake".  The 
district court also concluded that the "lawsuit irrevocably 
impaired [Feldman's] ability to function as an auditor at PHA".  
Consequently, the district court submitted to the jury the issue 
of the amount of front pay that Feldman should be awarded.   
 PHA also argues that because Paone and Saidel are no 
longer with PHA, the animosity is no longer present.  Even on 
this appeal, PHA has joined Paone and Saidel in their continuing, 
albeit unsuccessful attack on Feldman's professional competence 
and personal integrity.  The record contains ample evidence of 
the hostility that was caused by this litigation.  The facts 
surrounding Feldman's firing, together with defendants' 
litigation strategy, are but two examples of the irreparable 
animosity that resulted.  We conclude that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in allowing front pay rather than 
reinstatement.   
 During this litigation, PHA offered Feldman another 
position at the agency.  However, having determined that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the 
alternate remedy of front pay, we need not address the effect of 
Feldman's rejection of the offer.     
 Contrary to PHA's contention, neither Feldman nor the 
court was bound by Feldman's alternative request for 
reinstatement made in the wherefore clause of his complaint.  
  
Relief is determined by the merits of the case, not by the 
pleadings.  Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that "every final judgment shall grant the relief to 
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even 
if the party has not demanded such relief in the party's 
pleadings."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c).   
 In short, we see no reason at this late date to 
overturn the district court's determination, fully supported by 
the record when made, that front pay was appropriate relief in 
the circumstances of this case. 
 
C. Amount of Front Pay 
 PHA asserts that even if some front pay was 
appropriate, the jury's award of $500,000 was excessive, 
considering Feldman's age, experience, and future likelihood of 
employment.  While PHA's argument is cast in terms of 
excessiveness, it, at times, seems to be faulting the district 
court for failing to instruct the jury on mitigation of damages, 
i.e., on what the jury should do if it believed Feldman would be 
capable of securing other employment at some point prior to 
retirement age.  The district court did instruct the jury on this 
point, however.  Its charge was not materially different from 
that requested by the defense and was not objected to by it.  The 
court's instruction was: 
  "Now, award of front pay or future 
damages is used to make the plaintiff whole 
for future expected losses.  In calculating 
such an award, you must consider the expected 
future damages caused by defendants' wrongful 
  
conduct from the date of judgment to the date 
of retirement by the plaintiff, less any 
wages and benefits he might receive during 
that same period of time.  In other words, 
future damages in this case consists of what 
Mr. Feldman would have earned in wages and 
benefits working at PHA, less whatever he 
earns from any other employment he undertakes 
from the date judgment is entered to the date 
of his expected retirement.   
 
  If PHA proves that Mr. Feldman 
unjustifiably failed or fails to take a new 
job of like kind, status and pay which is 
available to him or he fails to make 
reasonable efforts to find a new job, you 
must also subtract any amount he could have 
earned in that new job after today." 
 
 Based on these instructions, the jury awarded to 
Feldman front pay of $500,000.  The jury's verdict may not be 
disturbed unless the record is critically devoid of the minimal 
amount of evidence upon which the jury could have reached its 
verdict.  See Swineford, 15 F.3d at 1265; Dutton v. Wolpoff and 
Abramson, 5 F.3d 649, 653 (3rd Cir. 1993).  On this record, we 
think that the evidence supports the jury award. 
 Feldman's actuarial-economic expert testified exten-
sively on plaintiff's lost future income, making several 
sophisticated calculations that produced various figures, 
depending upon which criteria he applied.  The $500,000 award, 
however, was over $30,000 less than the lowest figure calculated 
by Feldman's expert.  Defendants called no expert of their own, 
and they offered no evidence to controvert the testimony of 
Feldman's expert.  
  
 The jury's award, therefore, was sufficiently supported 
by the evidence, and we do not think that $500,000 is so 
excessive as to shock the conscience of this court.  See Savarese 
v. Agriss, 883 F.2d 1194, 1205 (3d Cir. 1989).     
 
D. Punitive Damages 
 The jury awarded punitive damages against Paone and 
Saidel, in their individual capacities, in the amount of $10,000 
each.  Both of them contend that their conduct here does not sink 
to the level that would permit punitive damages.  In addition, 
Saidel argues that he should not have been found liable for 
punitive damages because he did not have sufficient involvement 
with Feldman's firing.  We disagree with both contentions.   
 Punitive damages are authorized on Feldman's federal 
and state law claims. 
 In a § 1983 action: 
 [A] jury may be permitted to assess punitive 
damages * * * when the defendant's conduct is 
shown to be motivated by evil motive or 
intent, or when it involves reckless or 
callous indifference to the federally 
protected rights of others.  
 
Smith v Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).  Similarly, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that "punitive damages may 
be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the 
defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the 
rights of others."  Feld v. Merriam, 506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742, 
747 (Pa. 1984) (internal quotations omitted). 
  
 It is true that Paone's conduct was more culpable than 
Saidel's.  The record contains evidence, however, from which the 
jury could reasonably have concluded that Saidel not only knew 
about and acquiesced in, but also directed Paone's firing of 
Feldman for engaging in his constitutionally protected speech.  
Saidel and Paone worked closely together on PHA matters, and 
Feldman's reports implicated both Saidel and Paone in the 
mismanagement of PHA.  Paone testified that before firing 
Feldman, he spoke with Saidel about the matter and that Saidel 
"concurred" with the decision to terminate Feldman.  Paone 
further testified that he and Saidel discussed the reorganization 
of the Internal Audit Department, one of the pretextual reasons 
initially offered for their discharge of Feldman.  However, the 
Internal Audit Department, with only a few minor changes, 
remained the same.  In response to written interrogatories, 
defendants admitted that the only step taken to reorganize the 
department was that the director of the Internal Audit Department 
"no longer reports to the Board of Commissioners but reports to 
the Executive Director".   
 The jury could reasonably have inferred that Paone 
would not have engaged in the unlawful firing of Feldman without 
first consulting with and obtaining Saidel's approval, that 
Saidel thus participated in the retaliatory firing of Feldman; 
that they fired him in order to conceal their own mismanagement 
at PHA; and that this conduct sank to the levels of conduct that 
justify imposition of punitive damages under both federal and 
  
Pennsylvania law.  We conclude that both Paone and Saidel must 
pay the modest punitive damages the jury assessed against them.  
 We have considered defendants' remaining arguments and 
find them to be similarly without merit. 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
_______________________________________ 
 
 
 
 Feldman v. Philadelphia Housing Auth. 
 Nos. 93-1977, 93-1978, 93-2115, 93-2129, 93-2139 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
 While I agree with the majority's conclusion that 
Feldman's actions as Director of Internal Audit at the 
Philadelphia Housing Authority were entitled to First Amendment 
protection under Pickering, I find that the majority's failure to 
identify any evidence supporting (1) the failure to reinstate 
Feldman, (2) the excessive front pay award of $500,000, and (3) 
the punitive damage award imposed upon Saidel requires reversal.  
 Thus, I would reverse and remand to the district court 
with instructions that it order reinstatement of Feldman, that it 
vacate the front pay award of $500,000 and that it vacate the 
punitive damage award against Saidel. 
 
  
 I 
 So that my disagreement with the majority may be 
clearly understood, I fault the majority's opinion because it 
does not point to any evidence in the record nor does it discuss 
the relevant case law, which can support an affirmance of the 
three issues I have identified.  In my view, it is not sufficient 
to state in a conclusory manner that there is "ample evidence" to 
support the court's finding (Maj. Op, p. 17) without calling 
attention to at least some evidence.  Nor is it sufficient to 
decide complex issues such as front pay or restitution with 
little reference to the criteria established in case law and 
without relating the facts of record to those criteria.  Indeed, 
one can search long and hard in the record for the evidence which 
"fully support[s]" the district court's determination that front 
pay to retirement was appropriate relief in this case.  (Maj. Op. 
p. 18.)  But that search reveals nothing.  One can look even 
harder to find evidence that would support a $500,000 front pay 
award to retirement for a 38-year-old professional auditor who 
rejected an annual salary of $66,616 in favor of working for 
$12,500 annually and who has an opportunity to reestablish 
himself in the job market long prior to his retirement. 
 Finally, there is just no evidence to be found in the 
record of outrageous, wanton or reckless conduct on the part of 
Saidel.  This is the standard by which punitive damages are 
measured.  While there is evidence in the record that supports 
  
compensatory damages -- specifically Saidel's concurrence in the 
decision to discharge Feldman, this meager fact alone does not 
warrant a punitive damage award against Saidel.  The majority's 
decision suggests that a supervisor's concurrence in any unlawful 
discharge must result in both compensatory and punitive damages, 
a doctrine which Pennsylvania has yet to adopt.   
 In short, my quarrel with the majority is that it has 
taken unwarranted liberties with the record and has glossed over 
the lack of evidence in reaching its conclusions.   Having set 
forth the predicate for this separate opinion, I now recite in 
some detail the reasons why I disagree so strongly with the 
majority on the three issues I have identified:  reinstatement, 
excessive front pay and punitive damages. 
 
 II 
 In his original complaint, and in his amended 
complaint, Feldman asked to be reinstated to his former position 
at the housing authority.  A few months before trial, PHA offered 
to reinstate Feldman to a different position, but at the same 
salary. 
 Thereafter, Feldman filed a motion asking the district 
court to rule that PHA had failed to offer him a "substantially 
equivalent" position and that reinstatement was not a viable 
remedy as a result of continuing animosity between him and PHA. 
  
 Immediately before closing arguments, the district 
court granted Feldman's motion.  Ultimately, the jury awarded 
Feldman $500,000 in front pay in lieu of reinstatement.  In a 
post-trial motion, PHA, in addition to arguing that the front pay 
award was improper and excessive, also argued that the district 
court had erred in ruling that reinstatement was inappropriate.  
The district court rejected PHA's arguments.   
 In particular, the district court reiterated its view 
that reinstatement was not a feasible remedy because 
"[i]rreparable distrust and animosity [had] developed between 
Feldman and PHA as a result of the events prior to his 
termination, the termination itself, and the litigation that 
followed in its wake."  Dist. Ct. Order of 9/16/93 at 3.  The 
district court noted that: (1) Feldman had been fired for 
insubordination; (2) Feldman's ability to function as an auditor 
at PHA had been irrevocably impaired by his lawsuit; and (3) 
although Paone and Saidel no longer worked at PHA, "many of the 
people, with whom or for whom Feldman would work if he were to 
return, worked at PHA prior to his termination."  Dist. Ct. Order 
of 9/16/93 at 5. 
 In my opinion, the district court abused its discretion 
when it refused to reinstate Feldman. 
 
 III 
  
 In employment discrimination suits, there are two 
alternative remedies available to compensate a claimant for 
future lost earnings: reinstatement or front pay.  The 
determination of which remedy is appropriate is left to the 
discretion of the district court judge.  Blum v. Witco Chem. 
Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 374 n.4 (3d Cir. 1987); Maxfield v. Sinclair  
Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 796 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 
1057 (1986).  Only after the judge determines that reinstatement 
is not feasible, and that front pay is appropriate, does the jury 
calculate a front pay award.  Accordingly, when we review a 
district court's order to reinstate, or to deny reinstatement, we 
are not reviewing a jury determination.  Rather, we are reviewing 
a judge's ruling.  In reviewing the district court's exercise of 
discretion, we consider not only the reasons proffered by the 
district court for its determination, but also whether those 
reasons find support in the record. 
 It is well settled that reinstatement is the preferred 
remedy to avoid future lost earnings.  Maxfield, 766 F.2d at 796; 
see also James v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 21 F.3d 989, 997 (10th 
Cir. 1994); Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 
668, 678 (7th Cir. 1993); Roush v. KFC Nat'l Management Co., 10 
F.3d 392, 398 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 56 
(1994); Brunnemann v. Terra Int'l, Inc., 975 F.2d 175, 180 (5th 
Cir. 1992); Wilson v. S & L Acquisition Co., L.P., 940 F.2d 1429, 
1438 (11th Cir. 1991); Duke v. Uniroyal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 
  
1424 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 429 (1991); 
Cassino v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1346 (9th Cir. 
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1047 (1988).  Only when the 
evidence supports a judge's decision that reinstatement is not 
feasible, may he award front pay in lieu of reinstatement.  
Reinstatement may not be deemed feasible (1) where the 
relationship between the parties has been so damaged by animosity 
as to make reinstatement impracticable, Robinson v. Southeast Pa. 
Transp. Auth., 982 F.2d 892, 899 (3d Cir. 1993); Witco Chem. 
Corp., 829 F.2d at 373-74; Maxfield, 766 F.2d at 796; or (2) 
where no comparable position is available to which the claimant 
can be reinstated.  Witco Chem. Corp., 829 F.2d at 374; 
Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 
1984). 
  
  A. 
 I believe that the record simply does not support the 
district court's finding that substantial animosity had developed 
between Feldman and PHA -- as opposed to the animosity that had 
evolved between Feldman, on the one hand, and Paone and Saidel on 
the other.  Nor has the majority identified any such evidence.  
Speculation that Saidel might, in the future, be re-elected to 
the position of city comptroller and, in that capacity, be 
permitted to appoint persons to the Board of Commissioners, which 
in turn governs PHA, simply is too remote to support an award of 
front pay in lieu of reinstatement and is no substitute for 
evidence.  Accordingly, in my opinion, the district court's 
finding of fact that Feldman could not enjoy a productive working 
relationship with PHA were he to be reinstated, is clearly 
erroneous. 
 Unlike almost all cases in which reinstatement is 
denied, here there is no record evidence of lingering hostility 
between Feldman and any individual still working at PHA.1  While 
                     
 
   1 See, e.g., Robinson, 982 F.2d at 899 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(affirming district court's denial of reinstatement where 
evidence supported finding of lingering hostilities between 
plaintiff and his supervisors); Versarge v. Township of Clinton, 
984 F.2d 1359 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding reinstatement inappropriate 
"because of the great animosity between plaintiff and other 
volunteer firefighters"); Standley v. Chilhowee R-IV Sch. Dist., 
5 F.3d 319, 322 (8th Cir. 1993) (upholding district court's 
denial of plaintiffs' request for reinstatement to former 
teaching positions on grounds that (1) school district and school 
building were very small; (2) record was filled with testimony 
regarding tense and hostile atmosphere at school between 
plaintiffs, individual defendants, and other teachers; and (3) 
  
some PHA employees testified at trial, their testimony did not 
reveal any animus towards Feldman.  See Bingman v. Natkins & Co., 
937 F.2d 553, 558 (10th Cir. 1991) (affirming district court's 
finding that work place would not be unduly hostile where "all 
persons involved in plaintiff's termination testified, and none 
showed animosity toward him because of [his] lawsuit"). 
 Most importantly, Paone and Saidel no longer work for 
the Philadelphia Housing Authority.  See, e.g., Rodgers, 12 F.3d 
at 678 (affirming district court's award of reinstatement where 
supervisor, whose racial comments had been the impetus for 
Rodgers' Title VII action, no longer worked for Western-
Southern); Marshall v. TRW, Inc., 900 F.2d 1517, 1523 (10th Cir. 
1990) (reversing award of front pay where two employees who made 
the decision to discharge Marshall were no longer employed by 
TRW); Morgan v. The Arkansas Gazetteer, 897 F.2d 945, 953 (8th 
Cir. 1990) (affirming reinstatement order where any animosity was 
eradicated inasmuch as employees responsible for the 
                                                                  
friction that precipitated lawsuit would dog the school districts 
if plaintiffs were returned to their positions); Tennes v. 
Commonwealth of Mass. Dep't of Revenue, 944 F.2d 372, 381 (7th 
Cir. 1991) (affirming denial of reinstatement where there was no 
reason to believe that parties would enjoy a productive and 
amicable working relationship); Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 
1150, 1157 (10th Cir.) (affirming award of front pay in lieu of 
reinstatement where record supported Spulak's assertion that K 
Mart's investigation of Spulak's alleged illegal activities "left 
his employees with the impression that he was guilty of 
wrongdoing, rendering him unable to function amicably and 
productively in his former supervisory capacity," and where the 
level of animosity between Spulak and K Mart only increased as a 
result of the litigation). 
  
discrimination no longer worked for the Arkansas Gazetteer); 
Jackson v. City of Albuquerque, 890 F.2d 225, 232 (10th Cir. 
1989) (reversing district court's denial of reinstatement where 
"most of those making complaints against [Jackson] are no longer 
employed" by the City's park department). 
 Although this might be a very different case were Paone 
and Saidel still employed by PHA, quite clearly, they are not.  
See, e.g., Grantham v. Trickey, 21 F.3d 289, 296 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(concluding that unacceptable level of hostility existed and, 
thus, reinstatement not feasible, inasmuch as claimant would have 
to report to supervisor with whom he had "the most bitter 
conflict"); Prive v. Marshall, Erdman & Assocs., Inc., 966 F.2d 
320, 325 (7th Cir. 1992) (disapproving "reinstatement of a high-
level employee performing discretionary functions into the 
division from which he was fired and which remains under the 
management of the person who fired him").  That distinction 
dictates a vastly different result from that reached by the 
district court and now affirmed by the majority of this court. 
 In addition, between the time Feldman filed his first 
complaint and the time he filed his amended complaint, HUD took 
over PHA and appointed a special master to assume control of the 
housing authority's daily operations.  PHA, under new management, 
has given every indication that it would like to see Feldman 
return.  Although the litigation of Feldman's claim may have 
generated animosity, that animosity, as I have pointed out, was 
  
generated by or against Paone and Saidel, and not by or against 
PHA.  Moreover, despite the majority's reliance upon this factor, 
the existence of litigation-based hostility, without more, 
generally is not sufficient to defeat reinstatement.2  (Maj. Op. 
p. 17).  Whether or not it might be uncomfortable for Feldman to 
return to work at PHA, our jurisprudence implicitly tolerates 
such discomfort as an unavoidable concomitant of our well-
established preference for reinstatement over front pay. 
 Concededly, the general rule is that a district court 
may exercise its discretion to award front pay in lieu of 
reinstatement.  Its determination, however, must be well reasoned 
and supported by record evidence.  Here, there is not even a 
                     
    
2
 See Grantham, 21 F.3d at 296 (holding hostility necessary to 
support award of front pay "must go beyond the normal hostility 
between parties to litigation"); United States E.E.O.C. v. 
Century Broadcasting Corp., 957 F.2d 1446, 1462 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(rejecting claim of hostility where only hostility present was 
that "hostility common to litigation"); Walther v. Lone Star Gas 
Co., 952 F.2d 119, 127 (5th Cir. 1992) (vacating award of front 
pay where district court stated only that the litigation was 
"protracted and necessarily vexing" and did not support its 
finding with specific instances of discord); Goldstein v. 
Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1448 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(affirming reinstatement of plaintiff who had argued that 
litigation caused ill feelings between himself and persons who 
would be his immediate superiors, but where supervisor testified 
that he would be happy to have plaintiff back under same terms as 
when he left); Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 
276, 281 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding "friction arising from the 
litigation process itself is not alone sufficient to deny 
employment").  Cf. Berndt v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Sales, Inc., 
789 F.2d 253, 261 (3d Cir. 1986) (upholding district court's 
award of front pay in lieu of reinstatement where "relationship 
between plaintiff and Kaiser has been so damaged by the 
litigation that a continued working relationship for the four 
months remaining until plaintiff will retire is not feasible"). 
  
scintilla of evidence that Feldman's working relationship with 
PHA, as distinguished from his relationship with the now absent 
Paone and Saidel, would be tainted by any animosity.  
Unfortunately, the majority, as I have earlier indicated, has not 
called our attention to any evidence supporting the district 
court or its conclusion.  This is not surprising as there is no 
such evidence disclosed in the record.   
 Thus, inasmuch as the district court's determination 
that reinstatement was not feasible was grounded on its 
unsupported and, therefore, erroneous finding that there was 
unabated hostility between Feldman and PHA, the district court's 
determination was an abuse of discretion. 
 
 B. 
 It should not be overlooked, as I have emphasized, that 
the question of whether reinstatement, in fact, is viable, is a 
question for the judge and not the jury.  Thus, it is the judge 
who must determine whether the claimant's former position still 
exists or whether it has been eliminated, whether a comparable 
position is available, whether reinstatement should proceed, and 
how.  In the present case, not only did PHA make an offer of 
reinstatement, but it conceded that, regardless of PHA's offer, 
had the district court ordered reinstatement, PHA would have been 
obligated to reestablish Feldman's position, and reinstate him to 
it. 
  
 Although the district court found that the position 
offered by PHA to Feldman before trial was not substantially 
equivalent to the one Feldman held before he was fired, the 
district court did not make any explicit findings as to whether 
some other substantially equivalent position existed at PHA to 
which Feldman could be reinstated.3  See, e.g., Anderson v. 
Phillips Petroleum Co., 861 F.2d 631, 638 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(reversing award of front pay and ordering reinstatement where 
company could have reinstated Anderson to a comparable position); 
cf. Nelson v. Boatmen's Bancshares, Inc., 26 F.3d 796 (8th Cir. 
1994) (upholding district court front pay award where district 
court found that Nelson's position no longer existed and that 
there was no comparable position to which he could be 
reinstated).  Nor did the district court make a determination 
with respect to whether a position could have been created to 
which Feldman could be reinstated. 
 PHA asserted at oral argument that Feldman could have 
been reinstated to the exact same position he held before he was 
fired.  I grant that this somewhat belated assertion must be 
accepted with a measure of skepticism inasmuch as it differs from 
the position advanced by PHA before the district court.  There 
PHA argued that IAD had been completely reorganized and that its 
                     
    
3
 Front pay also may be awarded in lieu of reinstatement where 
no comparable position is available to which the claimant can be 
reinstated.  Witco Chem. Corp., 829 F.2d at 374; Whittlesey, 742 
F.2d at 728 (2d Cir. 1984). 
  
pre-trial offer to Feldman of "Chief, Procurement Audit Unit" was 
the best it could do.  In this connection, Feldman had claimed 
before the district court that his former position, "Director of 
Internal Audit," had been renamed "Manager of Internal Audit" and 
that, at the time of trial, the position was filled by a former 
subordinate, Edward Merenda. 
 I am satisfied that reinstatement still would be 
feasible, and an available remedy, even though a third person 
might now occupy Feldman's former position.  For example, in 
Reeves v. Claiborne County Bd. of Ed., 828 F.2d 1096, 1101-1102 
(5th Cir. 1987), the district court refused to reinstate Reeves 
to her former position because a replacement had been hired 
during the course of the litigation.  The Fifth Circuit reversed: 
 If the existence of a replacement constituted 
a complete defense against reinstatement, 
then reinstatement could be effectively 
blocked in every case merely by hiring an 
innocent third party after the retaliatory 
purpose was achieved. . . . While 
reinstatement may displace an innocent 
employee, the "[e]nforcement of 
constitutional rights [may have] disturbing 
consequences.  Relief is not restricted to 
that which would be pleasing and free of 
irritation." 
Id. at 1102 (citations omitted); see also Brunnemann, 975 F.2d at 
180 (affirming reinstatement order even though Brunnemann's 
former position already was held by another employee where there 
was no evidence of animosity or hostility between the parties).  
Contra United States E.E.O.C. v. Century Broadcasting Corp., 957 
F.2d 1446, 1463 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding reinstatement not 
  
feasible where claimant's position had been filled by third 
party). 
 I see no reason why reinstatement here could not be 
ordered as it is with respect to workers who are discharged as 
the result of, or who go out on strike to protest, an employer's 
unfair labor practice.  "Under those circumstances, the striking 
employees do not lose their status [as employees] and are 
entitled to reinstatement with back pay, even if replacements for 
them have been made."  Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 
270, 278 (1956).  That is, "an employer must dismiss replacement 
workers if necessary to make room for the returning unfair labor 
practice strikers."  NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U.S. 
48, 50-51 (1972); see, e.g., Aguayo for NLRB v. Tomco Carburetor 
Co., 853 F.2d 744, 750 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting Tomco's 
argument that reinstatement would be inappropriate because eleven 
innocent workers would have to be discharged and holding that 
"the rights of the employees who were discriminatorily discharged 
are superior to the rights of those whom the employer hired to 
take their places").  Inasmuch as Feldman was fired, essentially, 
as the result of an unfair labor practice, I see no reason why 
his right to reinstatement -- the relief he requested originally 
and our preferred remedy -- should be subordinated to the rights 
of whichever employee was hired to replace him. 
 In light of the unequivocal representation made by PHA 
to us that, if reinstated, Feldman would have his former position 
  
reactivated, I would remand to the district court to accept PHA's 
offer and to order that Feldman be reinstated as Director of 
Internal Audit or its equivalent with appropriate back pay. 
 
  
 IV 
 Even if front pay were appropriate in the present case, 
the $500,000 actually awarded to Feldman by the jury was clearly 
excessive.  See Williams v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 817 
F.2d 1030, 1038 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 
 A. 
 PHA argues that Feldman should not have been granted 
front pay until the age of retirement but, rather, until a point 
in time at which he "would be expected to regain a position at 
the level of the one he lost when his employment was terminated."  
Appellant's Br. at 43. 
 The time period over which the jury calculated its 
front pay award goes to the heart of the question of whether that 
award was excessive.  We have held that "[i]n selecting a cut-off 
date for an equitable front pay remedy the [district] court 
exercises discretion."  Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 
885, 890 (3d Cir. 1984).  Accordingly, in determining whether the 
front pay amount awarded by the jury was excessive, it is proper 
for us to consider whether the district court's front pay 
instruction to the jury caused the jury to return with a front 
pay award that was excessive.4  That instruction required that 
                     
    
4
 PHA's requested jury instruction, which was not granted by 
the district court, did not limit the end date to "retirement."  
Rather, it would have instructed the jury, among other things, 
that "[i]f you decide to award [front pay], front pay begins 
today.  It ends when James Feldman would have stopped working for 
  
the jury calculate its front pay award "from the date of judgment 
to the date of retirement by the plaintiff." 
 I conclude that the district court abused its 
discretion in selecting a cut-off date ("retirement") which was 
unreasonable in the context of this case.  As a result, the jury 
granted to Feldman an excessive front pay award. 
 
 B. 
 The purpose of front pay is to make an injured employee 
whole by compensating him for future lost earnings resulting from 
his wrongful termination.  The future, of course, is unknown, and 
we have been reluctant to award front pay where such an award 
would be overly speculative.  Goss, 747 F.2d at 889.  Common 
sense dictates that the farther into the future a front pay award 
reaches, the more speculative it becomes.  Consequently, "[a] 
claimant's work and life expectancy are pertinent factors in 
                                                                  
PHA (because of retirement or termination or otherwise) in the 
absence of dismissal." 
 
 Despite the majority's contention to the contrary (Maj. Op. 
p. 18-19), the district court did not leave it to the jury to 
determine the termination date for front pay.  Rather, the 
district court instructed the jury to award front pay from the 
date of judgment to the date of retirement.  See id. at 19.  
Thus, the instruction given by the district court to the jury was 
fundamentally different from the instruction requested by PHA.  
The PHA instruction, as noted in text, left to the jury the 
appropriate cutoff date for front pay. 
 
 
  
calculating front pay."  Anastasio v. Schering Corp., 838 F.2d 
701, 709 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 When a plaintiff's work expectancy is relatively short, 
it is not overly speculative and, therefore, appropriate to award 
front pay "to retirement."  Duke v. Uniroyal, Inc., 928 F.2d 
1413, 1424 (4th Cir. 1991) ("If a plaintiff is close to 
retirement, front pay may be the only practical approach.").  
Thus, in ADEA cases, front pay often is awarded from the date of 
discharge to the date of retirement based on the assumption that, 
in many instances, ADEA claimants will not work long enough to 
reestablish themselves in the marketplace.  See, e.g., Witco 
Chem. Corp., 829 F.2d at 374-76 (awarding "front pay-to-
retirement" where plaintiffs were all within eight years of 
normal retirement age when terminated and, therefore, it was not 
overly speculative to assume that the plaintiffs would have 
finished their working careers working for Witco). 
 This is not to say, however, that all front pay awards 
should be calculated to the plaintiff's date of retirement.  In 
fact, not even all ADEA claimant's are entitled to "front pay-to-
retirement."  See Anastasio, 838 F.2d at 709 ("The purpose of 
front pay under the ADEA is to ensure that a person who has been 
discriminated against on the basis of age is made whole, not to 
guarantee every claimant who cannot mitigate damages by finding 
comparable work an annuity to age 70."); Davis v. Combustion 
Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984) (noting that an 
  
award of front pay to 41-year old until normal retirement age 
might be unwarranted while failure to make such an award to 63-
year old might be an abuse of discretion).5 
 In those cases in which the plaintiff is not close to 
retirement age, the expectation that he will continue working 
tempers the need for "front pay-to-retirement," the award of 
which might constitute a "windfall" for the plaintiff.  Standley 
v. Chilhowee R-IV School District, 5 F.3d 319, 322 (8th Cir. 
1993).  In such cases, one can only speculate "how long the 
plaintiff actually would have remained working at the job, 
whether the plaintiff soon would have left for a different, 
perhaps better-paying, job, or whether the plaintiff soon would 
have been dismissed for legitimate reasons."  Id.  Consequently, 
the general rule in such cases is that front pay may only be 
awarded "for a reasonable future period required for the victim 
to reestablish her rightful place in the job market."  Goss, 747 
F.2d at 889; see also Cassino v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 817 F.2d 
                     
    
5
 It is not surprising that relevant caselaw reveals that 
"front pay-to-retirement" only has been awarded where the 
plaintiff is close to retirement age.  See, e.g., Boehm v. 
American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 929 F.2d 482, 488 (9th Cir. 
1991) (awarding six years "front pay-to-retirement" where 
district court found that Boehm would not be able to obtain a 
position equivalent to his former job); Witco Chem. Corp., 829 
F.2d at 373-74 (awarding "front pay-to-retirement" where 
plaintiffs were within eight years of retirement); Davis, 742 
F.2d at 923 (approving jury's $88,000 front pay award, based on 
district court's finding that Davis was 59 years old and facing 
mandatory retirement in six years). 
  
at 1347 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that front pay is intended to be 
temporary in nature). 
 Just as it is a plaintiff's duty to mitigate his 
damages prior to trial, see Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 
232 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1030 (1981), it is expected 
that he will continue to mitigate his damages into the future.  
Maxfield, 766 F.2d at 796 (recognizing that plaintiff's duty to 
mitigate serves as a control on front pay damage awards); 
Whittlesey, 742 F.2d at 728 (noting that award of front pay "does 
not contemplate that a plaintiff will sit idly by and be 
compensated for doing nothing"). 
 The Second Circuit explained this concept of "future 
mitigation" in Dominic v. Consolidated Edison Co., 822 F.2d 1249 
(2d Cir. 1987), a case in which the Court of Appeals upheld a 
district court's decision to reduce an ADEA claimant's front pay 
award: 
 Had Con Edison proved that Dominic failed to 
mitigate damages -- for example, by refusing 
a substantially equivalent job -- Dominic's 
back-pay award would have been cut off or 
reduced at the time of his failure to 
mitigate and any front-pay award would have 
been foreclosed.  See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 
458 U.S. 219, 233-34 (1982).  However, Con 
Edison's failure to show that Dominic had not 
mitigated damages does not entitle him to a 
lifetime front-pay award.  In calculating the 
size of a front-pay award the court must 
estimate the plaintiff's ability to mitigate 
damages in the future. 
  
Id. at 1258 (affirming district court's award of two years front 
pay) (emphasis added).  It follows that a plaintiff may only 
receive front pay for that period of time reasonably necessary 
for him to mitigate his losses.  See Cassino, 817 F.2d at 1347 
(reversing front pay award where jury, "without instruction on 
mitigation, found that Cassino was entitled to front pay from the 
time of trial until the time he would have retired"); Fitzgerald 
v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945, 956 (10th Cir. 1980) 
(awarding front pay for five years to reflect amount of time 
necessary for plaintiff to reach the current salary of the 
position from which he was fired). 
 Simply stated, the longer a plaintiff is expected to 
work, the more likely it becomes that he will have sufficient 
opportunity to mitigate his damages.  Given this likelihood of 
mitigation, the longer the period upon which a front pay award is 
based, the more likely that the award will be overly speculative. 
 
 C. 
 In the present case, Feldman was fired from an auditing 
position at which he was earning $66,616 per year.  Prior to 
trial, HUD, which had taken over PHA, offered to reinstate 
Feldman to an auditing position, at his old salary.  Feldman 
refused the offer.  Six months after his discharge, Feldman had 
accepted a non-salaried "sales-like" position with the Individual 
Financial Services Division of the CIGNA Corporation -- a 
  
position unrelated to auditing -- which paid Feldman $12,500 a 
year. 
 I agree that PHA's actions caused Feldman significant 
harm.  Feldman testified that his firing had an emotional effect 
on his family life.  The jury awarded him $50,000 to compensate 
him for his mental and emotional distress. 
 Front pay, however, is not intended as damages for 
mental distress.  Rather, front pay is designed to reimburse a 
claimant for his future lost earnings.  I do not believe that, 
under the circumstances, it was reasonable for Feldman to refuse 
a job similar (though not identical) to the one from which he was 
fired -- a job that would have paid him $66,616 a year -- when he 
was earning only $12,500 in a field unrelated to the one for 
which he was trained.  Rather, I am convinced that, had Feldman 
acted reasonably, he would not have suffered a future loss of the 
magnitude that is reflected in the jury's outrageous $500,000 
front pay award. 
 Furthermore, I would conclude that the $500,000 front 
pay award was excessive, even if I were persuaded that Feldman, 
in fact, was justified in turning down HUD's reinstatement offer.  
At the time of trial, Feldman was thirty-eight years old.  By all 
accounts, he is a highly trained professional.  He has been in 
the work force for fewer than twenty years.  He will be part of 
the work force, one can expect, for, at least, another twenty-
seven years.  In light of these uncontroverted facts, there can 
  
be no justification for, just as there is no legitimate evidence 
supporting, the $500,000 front pay award, calculated to Feldman's 
retirement age of 65. 
 Under these circumstances, to have permitted the jury 
to consider a front pay award to retirement was an abuse of 
discretion on the part of the district court.  While we have 
never said so explicitly, I believe that it was the district 
court's responsibility to determine, and then to instruct the 
jury as to, a finite period over which the jury should have 
calculated its front pay award.  At worst, the district court 
should have instructed the jury to award front pay "for a 
reasonable future period required for [Feldman] to reestablish 
[his] rightful place in the job market."  Goss, 747 F.2d at 889.  
Whichever is the correct approach, clearly the district court 
abused its discretion when it directed the jury to calculate 
Feldman's front pay award to retirement. 
 I conclude that the jury's highly speculative front pay 
award -- $500,000 -- given the circumstances, was so "grossly 
excessive as to shock the judicial conscience."  Williams, 817 
F.2d at 1038.  I would direct that the front pay award be 
vacated. 
 
 VI 
 Saidel argues that the jury's verdict against him on 
both his compensatory and punitive liability must be reversed for 
  
lack of sufficient evidence.  While I agree with the majority 
that the record could be read to support the jury's finding with 
respect to Saidel's compensatory liability, I do not believe that 
there was sufficient evidence to satisfy the stricter standard 
which must be met in order for a jury to award punitive damages. 
 Punitive damages may be awarded in § 1983 actions "for 
conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil 
motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others."  
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 46-47 (1983), quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 908(2).  See also Savarese v. Agriss, 883 
F.2d 1194, 1204 (3d Cir. 1989).  Pennsylvania has adopted the 
same standard for awarding punitive damages.  See Chuy v. 
Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265, 1277 (3d Cir. 
1979) (in banc); Rizzo v. Haines, 555 A.2d 58, 69 (Pa. 1989). 
 I find nothing in the record which suggests that 
Saidel's single action of "concurring" in Paone's decision to 
terminate Feldman's employment was so "outrageous" as to merit 
the imposition of punitive liability.  Nor has the majority 
directed our attention to any such evidence of that nature.  
There is just no evidence in the record that Saidel's action 
exhibited a reckless or callous disregard of, or indifference to, 
Feldman's rights.  Nor is there any evidence that Saidel's 
conduct was outrageous.  See Tunis Brothers Co. v. Ford Motor 
Co., 952 F.2d 715, 739-40 (3d Cir. 1991).  
  
 Concededly, the record suggests that Saidel was made 
aware of Feldman's IAD reports.  There also is record evidence 
that Paone conferred with Saidel before firing Feldman, just as 
there is record evidence that Saidel concurred in Paone's 
decision to fire Feldman.6 
                     
    
6
 Saidel testified at his deposition as follows: 
 
  Q: When you had the conversation with Mr. 
Paone regarding Mr. Feldman's firing did Mr. 
Paone ever say to you that he wanted Feldman 
fired for giving information to the HUD 
inspector general? 
 
  A: If I'm not mistaken he mentioned to me 
that one of the things he felt was a problem 
was that . . . Mr. Feldman did not follow the 
chain of command. 
App. VI at 1306.  At trial, Saidel testified as follows: 
  Q: Do you recall discussing Mr. Feldman's 
firing with Mr. Paone before he was fired? 
 
  A: I didn't discuss it with Mr. Paone.  Mr. 
Paone told me that he was contemplating 
dismissing Mr. Feldman. 
App. VIII at 2238.  Paone testified as follows: 
  A: . . . I discussed the situation with Mr. 
Saidel based on the meeting that I had with 
Mr. Feldman and I told Mr. Saidel that I 
wanted to terminate Mr. Feldman, asked his 
concurrence, he concurred. 
 
  Q: Did you actually terminate him that week? 
 
  A: No.  I terminated him two weeks later, May 
3d. 
 
  Q: And what was the reason for the delay? 
 
  
 Discharging an employee, however, can be a neutral, 
non-discriminatory action.  Here, there is no direct evidence 
that Saidel had knowledge of Paone's discriminatory motive in 
firing Feldman.  Nor is there any direct evidence that Saidel 
concurred in Paone's decision because of his own personal 
discriminatory motive. 
 In Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, 983 F.2d 459 (3d 
Cir. 1992), we vacated the punitive damages awarded against 
Philadelphia's Police Commissioner even though we upheld the 
compensatory damages imposed against him.  We held that even 
though Police Commissioner Tucker "had been fully aware of the 
actions of his subordinate command personnel in this particular 
case," this fact alone could not justify the imposition of 
punitive damages against him.  Id. at 471. 
 This case is much the same as Keenan and highlights the 
rule that "despite its utility as a deterrent, the punitive 
damage remedy must be reserved . . . for cases in which the 
defendant's conduct amounts to something more than a bare 
                                                                  
  A: Well there's a number of reasons.  We 
spent a day in Richmond, when I came back I 
talked to both Rich Brown who is the Director 
of Human Resources and Mr. Saidel again.  Mr. 
Saidel had a concern that [objection omitted] 
. . . Mr. Saidel's concern was that there 
would be a perception because of Mr. 
Feldman's position in terminating an Internal 
Auditor that we should touch base with 
relevant Federal officials first. 
 
App. VII at 1625-27. 
  
violation justifying compensatory damages or injunctive relief."  
Cochetto v. Desmond, 572 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1978).  See also 
Savarese, 883 F.2d at 1205 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting that "punitive 
damages in general represent a limited remedy, to be reserved for 
special circumstances"). 
 Here, where there is only minimal evidence supporting 
Saidel's liability for compensatory damages, and no evidence 
which would tend to show that Saidel's actions were in any way 
"outrageous," I believe that the imposition of punitive damages 
against Saidel was inappropriate and should be vacated. 
 
 VI 
 In sum, I would reverse and remand to the district 
court with instructions that it order the reinstatement of 
Feldman at the same salary to the same position or an equivalent 
position to the one he previously held at PHA.  I would vacate 
the front pay award of $500,000 as inappropriate upon Feldman's 
reinstatement and alternatively as excessive under the 
circumstances of this case.  Finally, I would vacate the $10,000 
award of punitive damages against Saidel.   
 I respectfully dissent from so much of the majority's 
opinion as holds otherwise.  
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